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Koehn: An Imperfect Body?

AN IMPERFECT BODY?
AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA
LEONE
Danielle Koehn
It is estimated that between 20,000 to 50,000 people died during the Sierra Leone civil
war. 30,000 people had a limb removed by the rebel forces and up to 257,000 acts of
sexual violence occurred. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up to bring those
most responsible for the conflict to justice. This paper will assess the effectiveness and
legacy of the court and seeks to show that while the Special Court is not perfect, the
positives far outweigh the negatives.
“I want to prosecute the people who forced thousands of children to commit unspeakable
acts.” – Special Court of Sierra Leone Prosecutor David Crane1
Introduction
For a decade Sierra Leone was caught up in a horrific civil war that featured mass
atrocities. In order to try and heal the wounds caused, achieve justice for the victims and
come to terms with what had happened, both the Special Court of Sierra Leone and a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission were set up through UN Security Council
Resolution 13152 at the request of President Kabbah.3 This paper will focus on the
Special Court of Sierra Leone and assess whether it will have a positive or negative
legacy. Due to the limitations of this paper and the breadth of this topic, this paper will
give only a brief overview of the conflict, the creation of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the relationship between the two
bodies. In the second part of this paper the Special Court will be analyzed by considering
1

Augustine S. J. Park, “Community-based restorative transnational justice in Sierra Leone,”
Contemporary Justice Review 13, no.1 (2010): 99.
2
William A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda and Sierra Leone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 36.
3
William A. Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” in Truth Commissions and Courts: The
Tension Between Criminal Justice and the Search for Truth, ed. William A. Schabas and Shane
Darcy (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004): 16
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the arguments for and against the court and its work. This paper seeks to show that while
the Special Court is not perfect, the positives far outweigh the negatives. This paper will
hold that the Special Court for Sierra Leone has brought much needed justice to the
atrocities committed against the Sierra Leonean people.
Overview
The Conflict
Sierra Leone is a former British colony located on the west coast of Africa. The conflict
began on March 23, 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) first invaded
Sierra Leone from Liberia. 4 Throughout the war, the RUF and the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) rebel groups fought against the government (Sierra
Leonean Army) and a government-backed militia group, the Civil Defence Forces
(CDF).5 During the conflict horrific crimes were committed, including the use of child
soldiers and forced marriages of girls and women to combatants.6 By 1999 the rebel
groups had descended upon Freetown, the capital, prompting the government to request
peace.7 It is estimated that between 20,000 to 50,000 people died during the conflict,
30,000 people had a limb removed by the rebels and up to 257,000 acts of sexual
violence were committed during the civil war.8

4

Ibid., 21.
Joseph F. Kamara, “Preserving the Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone: Challenges
and Lessons learned in Prosecuting Grave Crimes in Sierra Leone,” Leiden Journal of
International Law 22 (2009): 763.
6
Valerie Oosterveld, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers, and Forced Marriage:
Providing Clarity or Confusion?” Canadian Yearbook of International Law 45 (2007): 133.
7
Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and
Sierra Leone, 34.
8
Ploughshares, Armed Conflict Report: Sierra Leone (1991-first combat deaths), September
2002, http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-SierraLeone.html#Deaths.
5
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On July 7, 1999, the Lomé Peace Agreement was created through negotiations
between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone to end the war.9 The Togolese
Government, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the
Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), and the UN
signed on to the deal as “moral guarantors.”10 Within the deal there was agreement for an
immediate ceasefire, a general amnesty for combatants who committed crimes between
the start of the conflict and the date of the agreement, and the creation of a national
Human Rights Commission and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

11

A

qualification was added at the last minute to disassociate the UN from the pardon and
amnesty given to combatants to prepare for the establishment of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone.12 The treaty proved to be more of a ceasefire than a transition plan for
stability in Sierra Leone.13 The plan was that the agreement would address human rights
violations since the beginning of the conflict in 1991.14 However, there was an outbreak
of fighting in Sierra Leone for a few weeks in May 2000 that was quickly dealt with by
the government, which arrested many RUF supporters. Subsequently, a reassessment was

9

Zoe Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” in Rescuing a
Fragile State: Sierra Leone 2002-2008, ed. Lansana Gberie (Waterloo: LCMSDS Press of
Wilfred Laurier University, 2009): 29.
10
Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and
Sierra Leone, 34.
11
12

Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” 29.

Peter Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” in Rescuing a Fragile
State: Sierra Leone 2002-2008, ed. Lansana Gberie (Waterloo: LCMSDS Press of Wilfred
Laurier University, 2009): 55.
13
Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 15.
14
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 55.
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made of the amnesty that was granted in the Peace Agreement, resulting in the removal of
some signers’ amnesty.15
The Creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s President Kabbah wrote to the Security Council on August 9, 2000,
requesting the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute members of the
RUF and its accomplices who were responsible for committing the crimes against the
people of Sierra Leone and UN peacekeepers.16 Kabbah’s letter stated that the RUF had
“since reneged on [the Lomé] Agreement.”17 On August 14, 2000, the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 131518 requesting that the Secretary General “negotiate an
agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special
court.”19 A UN delegation led by Ralph Zacklin (Assistant Secretary General for Legal
Affairs) went to Freetown to negotiate terms for the establishment of a court that would
try those who bore the greatest responsibility for the war crimes and crimes against
humanity during the Sierra Leone Civil War.20 The Special Court was not confined to
prosecuting only those of Sierra Leonean nationality; however, as per the Rome Statute,
prosecution of foreign nationals was limited to circumstances in which the accused’s
national state was “unwilling or unable genuinely” to prosecute.21 Due to criticisms over
how other international courts had been set up outside of the country whose conflict it
15

Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and
Sierra Leone, 35.
16
Ibid.
17
Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 16.
18
Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and
Sierra Leone, 36.
19
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 56.
20
Ibid.
21
Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 22.
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was investigating, it was agreed that the Court’s hearings should take place in Freetown,
where some of the worst atrocities took place. The Court was set up to incorporate a
combination of international and Sierra Leonean law.22 While the Special Court is similar
to a hybrid tribunal (which brings an international component to essentially national
prosecutions),23 it is in fact more of an ad hoc tribunal because it is a creature of
international law, not domestic law.24
The final agreement to establish the Special Court of Sierra Leone was signed on
January 16, 2002, by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations.25 The
Parliament of Sierra Leone ratified the agreement in March 2002 when the Statute of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone was passed, providing the legal framework of the Court.26
Under the terms of the Statute the Court would cover crimes “committed in the territory
of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996,”27 the date of the Abidjan Peace Accord.28 In
order to be able to prosecute those who should be held accountable, the Statute
repudiated amnesties from the Lomé Peace Agreement (and the Abidjan Peace Accord
that had previously been signed) which involved crimes against humanity, violated
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II, or committed other
serious violations of international humanitarian law (crimes from Articles 2 to 4 of the

22

That being said, while Sierra Leone allows capital punishment, the maximum punishment the
Special Court allows is life in prison, which favours international law. On the other hand,
international law was not adhered to in regards to not trying children, as the Special Court will try
those 15 and over (it has not tried any children yet). Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra
Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 56.
23

Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda
and Sierra Leone, 5.
24

25
26

Ibid., 6.

Ibid., 5.

Ibid., 39.
27
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 59.
28
Ibid., 60.
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statute).29 However, the Statute excluded “any transgressions by peacekeepers and related
personnel.”30
There are three main bodies that make up the Special Court: the Chambers, made
up of a Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chambers; the Office of the Prosecutor; and the
Registry.31 On July 26, 2002, the Special Court32 appointed Pierre Boutet (Canada),
Benjamin Ite (Cameroon), and Bankole Thompson (Sierra Leone) as trial judges.
Emmanuel Ayoola (Nigeria), Hassan Jalloh (The Gambia), Renate Winter (Austria),
Geoffrey Robertson (UK), and George Gelaga King (Sierra Leone) were appointed as
appeal judges.33 Alternative judgeships were appointed to Isaac Abagye (Ghana) and
Elizabeth Muyovwe (Zambia).34 The Special Court judges were sworn into office in
December 2002.35 Robin Vincent (UK) was appointed to act as the Registrar due to her
experience.36 David Crane was made prosecutor due to his previous work in human rights
law and the inability to find an individual from Africa with the necessary experience
(which would have been preferred). Originally the statute setting up the Special Court
stated that the Deputy Prosecutor was to be Sierra Leonean; however, this was amended

29

United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for
Sierra Leone,” UN Doc S/2000/915, October 4, 2000, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/661/77/PDF/N0066177.pdf?OpenElement.
For the statute in its entirety, see Sierra Leone Government, “Statute of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone,” January 16, 2002, http://www.scl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3D&.
30
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 62.
31
Ibid., 57.
32
Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 20.
33
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 57.
34
Ibid., 58.
35
Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and
Sierra Leone, 39.
36
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 58.
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to allow for Desmond de Silva (British QC), who had been previously admitted to the Bar
in Sierra Leone.37
Beginning on March 7, 2003, and continuing for the next month, indictments were
announced for: Foday Sankoh (leader of the RUF), Sam Bockarie (RUF henchman
“Mosquito”), Issa Sesay (senior RUF Commander), Morris Kallon (senior RUF
Commander), Augustine Gfbao (senior RUF Commander), 38 Johnny Paul Koroma
(AFRC Chairman), Alexa Tamba Brima (AFRC member), Brima Bazzy Kamara (AFRC
member), Santigie Borbor Kanu (AFRC member), Chief Sam Hinga Norman (CDF
member), Moinana Fofana (CDF member), and Alieu Kondeqa (CDF member).39 Many
of the most important indictees and actors, however, had died or were unaccounted for.40
For example, by the time the Court was ready to begin trials in July of 2002,41 Sankoh,
Bockarie and Koroma had passed away and Johnny Paul Koroma was missing.42
This was naturally a very frustrating situation for those involved in the Court, as
these men were believed to bear the greatest responsibilities for the atrocities in Sierra
Leone’s war. This had such a large impact that some even called for the Court to be
disbanded.	
  43 There were concerns over the length of the proceedings, so in March 2004
the Special Court re-issued joint indictments for the CDF, RUF and AFRC trials. Many

37

Ibid.
Ibid., 60.
39
Ibid., 61.
40
Ozonnia Ojielo, “Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone,” in Rescuing a Fragile State:
Sierra Leone 2002-2008, ed. Lansana Gberie (Waterloo: LCMSDS Press of Wilfred Laurier
University, 2009): 50.
41
Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 19.
42
Ibid.
43
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 64.
38
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witnesses were called throughout the trials, a number of whom gave evidence
anonymously behind screens.44
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
One cannot discuss justice in Sierra Leone without looking at the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission as well. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
formally established July 5, 2002,45 had an ambitious mandate “to ‘create an impartial
historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian
law related to the armed conflict in Serra Leone’; to address impunity in the country; to
address the causes of the conflict with a view to prevent reoccurrence; to address the
needs of victims (especially those of children and those who had been sexually abused);
and, to promote reconciliation.” 46 The Commission was headed by Bishop Joseph
Humper47 as Chairman and Sierra Leonean lawyer, Yasmin Jusu-Sherriff as Executive
Secretary. Overall, the TRC was comprised of a mix of local and international
commissioners.48 The TRC was given independent status, some financial support for
investigations and was granted subpoena powers.49
At first, it was thought that people would not want to talk about abuses suffered or
admit to crimes. However, once the TRC began its work it was clear that there was a
great need for people to be heard, have their stories recorded and have their perpetrators
known.50 Originally, the presence of the Special Court deterred many perpetrators from
coming forward as they were afraid that the evidence would be used at the Special Court
44

Ibid.
Ojielo, “Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone,” 43.
46
Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” 29.
47
Ibid., 30.
48
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 62.
49
Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” 29.
50
Ibid., 30.
45
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against them or their former commanders.51 As it became evident that only those at the
top of command would be prosecuted under the Special Court, more perpetrators came to
the TRC.52
The TRC gathered information, had public and camera hearings (for children,
victims of sexual abuse and certain perpetrators), and allowed perpetrators to respond to
victim allegations when possible. However, this was rare as the accused were difficult to
locate due to relocations and fear of retaliation.53 Special arrangements were made for the
children’s hearings to protect their identities and ensure their well-being with
psychological workers present.54
Although the government created the TRC it has failed to give much attention to its
activities, final report and recommendations.55 Many people utilized the TRC, and the
popular experiences and airing of grievances created expectations for the future. Yet, not
much has been done by the government with these recommendations.56 While there may
have been some mistaken identities because of the flexibility of the TRC, information
was gathered that would not normally come to light because of the creativity and
protection of the TRC.57
The TRC found that “those in leadership in government, public life and civil
society failed the people of Sierra Leone.”58 The TRC also found that many were eager to

51

Ibid.
Ibid.
53
Ibid., 31.
54
Ibid., 32.
55
Ibid., 29.
56
Ibid., 30.
57
Ibid., 32.
58
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, “Chapter 2- Findings,” in Witness to
Truth- Volume 2, (2004): 32. Accessible online at http://www.sierraleone.org/TRCDocuments.html.
52
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blame the causes of the war on foreign elements and the search for diamonds as it took
away blame for political failure from the elites of Sierra Leone. 59 However, the
Commission ruled that:
“the central cause of the war was endemic greed, corruption and nepotism that
deprived the nation of its dignity and reduced most people to a state of poverty.
The Commission [held] the political elite of successive regimes in the postindependence period responsible for creating the conditions for conflict.”60
Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, the TRC held that many of the causes of the
conflict still exist in post-war Sierra Leone, and are potential causes of future conflict if
not addressed soon.61
In terms of accounting for the atrocities that took place, the TRC found that 60.5%
of the violations reported to the Commission were committed by the RUF, 9.8% by the
AFRC, 6.8% by the SLA, 6% by the CDF, and 1.5% by the ECOMOG force.62 The TRC
foresaw the reconciliation of Sierra Leone occurring in stages. First was the
establishment of the Lomé Peace Agreement, creating a viable environment for
reconciliation. Second was the moment when communities began to create activities in
which trust could be restored. Truth telling was an important stage of this process as were
reparations, which served as a symbolic acknowledgement of the wrongs suffered. The
third phase would occur when Sierra Leonean citizens would forgive one another for the
atrocities committed during the war, a process which may take decades.63
The Relationship between the TRC and Special Court

59

Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” 33.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, “Chapter 2- Findings,” 27.
61
Ibid., 107.
62
Ibid., 27.
63
Ojielo, “Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone,” 51.
60
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While both the TRC and the Special Court attempted to investigate and understand the
complex Sierra Leonean conflict, they did so from different perspectives. Both explained
to the people of Sierra Leone that the bodies were not working as a single unit, but valued
each other’s work towards post-conflict justice.64 In terms of how the TRC and Special
Court interacted, there was confusion and disagreement about each body’s role.65 It was
initially recommended by some that the two bodies share resources. However, once
operational it wasn’t clear how this would be feasible given their distinct mandates and
important independent tasks. 66 While both organizations utilized public education
campaigns67 throughout the country to promote their functions, the TRC received more
widespread support.68 The only significant dispute between the two bodies was over
testimony by indicted prisoners.69
Geoffrey Robertson, the first president of the Appeals Chamber of the Special
Court, argues that the tribunal had a special role to play in achieving reconciliation,
stating:
“Within the fallible parameter of human justice, with its fundamentals of due
process, transparency and defence of rights, we are charted to do our best to end
the impunity that powerful perpetrators would otherwise enjoy. This much is
owed to the memory of murdered victims, to maimed survivors and to those who
grieve for them. It is a duty we share with another body, the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission set up by the Sierra Leone government. We shall
work together to uncover the truth, although the Court alone has the power to
deliver the justice that is a prerequisite for reconciliation.”70
64

Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 5.
65
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 62.
66
Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 29.
67
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 62.
68
Ibid., 63.
69
Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 5.
70
Ojielo, “Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone,” 50.
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Analysis
Criticism of the Court
Creation of the Court
As previously mentioned, under the terms of the Statute, the Court would cover
crimes from November 30, 1996, onwards 71 (date of the Abidjan Peace Accord). 72
Utilizing this date, however, led many Sierra Leoneans to believe that the Court only
cared about the people living in Freetown and the Western Area, as much of the impact
of the war was not felt for these people until after November 1996. This further
entrenched the divide between the capital and the rest of Sierra Leone, which dates back
to the colonial era.73 Article 8 of this Statute enabled the Special Court to have primacy
over the Sierra Leone national courts, which had a significant impact when Defence
Counsel appearing before the Court said the Special Court was unconstitutional, since the
Sierra Leone constitution states that no court can have higher judicial authority than the
Sierra Leone Supreme Court.	
  74
Foreign Staff
There have been a number of criticisms regarding the court appointments, namely
that all “senior staff at the Special Court were expatriates.”75 This has been viewed as an
indication of a lack of respect and recognition of qualified Sierra Leoneans. Some felt

71

Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 59.
Ibid., 60.
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid., 56.
75
David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 2005): 319.
72
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that “[t]he Special Court does not trust Sierra Leone to administer justice. If they are not
trusted to administer justice, how can they be expected to accept it?”76
Further, Prosecutor Crane brought in many ex-military personnel as investigators,
which gave the Office of the Prosecutor an American military feel.77 Crane also made
controversial statements, such as that those indicted “would never see a free day again.”
These statements were made before their trials even occurred.78
Finances of the Court
When the Court initially began the Office of the Prosecution spent ten times more
than the Office of the Defence and employed three times more staff. 79 The Special Court
was also criticised for the particularly expensive cost of the Court itself, as it has spent
150 million dollars.80 This money comes from over thirty countries with the US, UK,
Netherlands, and Scandinavian countries as top donors. 81 However, for the second
poorest country in the world (according to the UNDP ranking), with people dying of
malnutrition, preventable medical diseases and the aftermath of war, it would be quite
difficult to see so much money being poured into this Special Court when the most
horrible of people are being treated better than the country’s citizens.82 On average the
indictments have so far cost 23 million dollars each.83
Length of the Operation

76

Ibid.
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 58.
78
Ibid., 61.
79
Ibid., 68.
80
Ibid., 67.
81
Ibid., 68.
82
For example, those imprisoned by the Special Court get 3 meals and 2 snacks a day, while
victims of the perpetrators likely have far less. Ibid., 67.
83
Ibid., 68.
77
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There have been criticisms regarding the length of time the Special Court has been
in operation, as it was only meant to last for three years and is still running today. The
initial three year plan was unrealistic in part because of the time it took to set up the
Court.84 While the plan was to have the Special Court complete all trials and appeals by
2010, it has not done so; an expert panel has predicted that the Tribunal will be “unable to
fulfil its mission before 2016.”85
Legal Ramifications
Some saw criminal prosecution, and thereby the Special Court, as a threat to peace
and security “and a Western intrusion in African accountability mechanisms.” 86 As
previously mentioned, three of the perpetrators who were considered the “worst” were
unable to be tried, which was a great disappointment and almost cause for dismantling
the Special Court.87
Many also saw the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the more appropriate
institution to bring peace and healing to the community. This was supported by pointing
to the fact that the TRC was met with more widespread support by Sierra Leoneans
themselves.88 “The Special Court promotes reconciliation through punishment, while the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission does not punish anyone, but promotes healing.”89
Or, as the TRC put it “[a] criminal justice body will have largely punitive and retributive
aims, whereas a truth and reconciliation body will have largely restorative and healing

84

Ibid.
Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and
Sierra Leone, 41.
86
Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 26.
87
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 64.
88
Ibid., 63.
89
Ibid.
85
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objectives.” 90 In addition, the TRC also had a direct impact on, and contact with,
people’s day-to-day lives. Finally, it did not help the Special Court that the TRC was
critical of how the Special Court allowed exceptions to the amnesty some thought they
would be granted when signing peace treaties.91
Arguments for the Court
Creation of the Court
Fortunately for the integrity of the Special Court, the defence claims that the
Special Court was unconstitutional were rejected.92 Also, the choice by the Court to try
crimes from after November 1996 was not meant to be a political statement or to value
the security of the capital over rural Sierra Leone; rather, it was a strategic decision
intended to target crimes committed after the Abidjan Peace Accord.93
Foreign Staff
With an international court, regardless of the location of the country it is hosted in,
it is inevitable that the court staff will be mostly foreign to that country. When dealing
with issues such as human rights and international criminal law it is best to employ the
leaders in the field, rather than take on local citizens for the sake of placating the host
country. Further, the situation in Sierra Leone was such that the prolonged conflict
inevitably killed and drove away many of the people who would be most qualified to
participate in the Court. It is important to note that Sierra Leoneans were not excluded
from the makeup of the Court, as Bankole Thompson was appointed as a trial judge and

90

Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Chapter 1- Executive Summary,” in Witness to TruthVolume 2 (2004): 18.
91
Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 63.
92
Ibid., 56.
93
Ibid., 60.
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George Gelaga King was made an appeal judge.94 Although the prosecutor ended up
being American it was clear that the original intent was to have this role filled by an
African.95 The deputy prosecutor was Desmond de Silva (British QC) who had been
previously admitted to the Bar in Sierra Leone.96
Local Impact
Because the Special Court was held within the country that experienced the
atrocities of the perpetrators, the community could feel more included in the justice
process than in previous ad hoc tribunals. The Court made outreach very important in its
operations with even Prosecutor Crane travelling to rural communities of Sierra Leone
that are not easily accessible.97 The outreach by the Court was so extensive that there was
a person designed for outreach in each of the provinces. Every Tuesday and Wednesday
school children would be educated about the history of the conflict and the work that the
Court was doing. The Court would reach out to the general population in a variety of
means including setting up booths at local markets.98 NGOs such as No Peace Without
Justice became involved in community outreach to facilitate public information and
sensitisation on the Special Court. The outreach program worked through other local
organizations to formulate the issues in a way that was easily understandable for the
general public, fostering the role of civil society in promoting accountability within

94

Ibid., 57.
Ibid., 58.
96
Ibid.
97
Park, “Community-based restorative transnational justice in Sierra Leone,” 99.
98
Anna Matas, “The International Criminal Court,” A lecture presented to the Canadian Center
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Sierra Leone.99 By having the local population able to understand and get updates on the
trials, the Special Court could bring justice to those who needed it most: the victims.
Because of this outreach, the citizens of Sierra Leone understand that those most
responsible for the atrocities must be brought to justice so that the society can heal and
look to the future. The outreach done by the Court and NGOs is the single most effective
way of reaching the Court’s underlying goals of encouraging peace and justice in this
fragile post conflict region.
Finances
While initially there was uneven funding between the offices of the prosecutor and
defence, it has since evened out.100 A possible explanation for this is that the prosecutor’s
office needed the finances initially to begin investigations before the indictments could be
announced. Once it was made public who would be charged it was then time for the
defence office to use its resources to defend the accused; to do so before hand would have
been impossible. While the expense of the Court overall may seem substantial, it is
significantly cheaper than others such as the Rwanda Tribunal, which costs 120 million
dollars per year 101 or 10 % of the UN’s overall budget for the ICTY and ICTR
combined.102 Further, the infrastructure that the Court has set up will be able to be
utilized by Sierra Leone once the Court has completed its work.
Length of the Operation
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When it was necessary to build a new facility, hire staff, investigate allegations, and
allow time for defence, initial trials and appeals, it should be of little surprise that the
Special Court is running longer then intended. It is better to have more thorough trials
when the issues at hand are of such national and international importance rather than
rushing through them for the sake of staying on schedule. The Court is currently in the
midst of the complex case of Charles Taylor at The Hague; however, on the whole the
Court is in the process of wrapping up its operations, as evidenced by the handing over of
security responsibilities from UN Peacekeepers to the Sierra Leone Police. This step is
significant as “the Special Court is set to become the first international tribunal to
complete its mandate and transition to a Residual Mechanism.”103
Legal Ramifications
Looking at the Special Court from a legal perspective, the Court has left, and will
continue to leave, a positive and significant legacy on the development of law both
nationally and internationally.
On the national level, Antonio Cassese, UN commissioned independent expert,
reported that the Court’s legacy includes “(a) use of the Special Court’s infrastructures;
(b) trials by Sierra Leonean courts of international crimes committed by middle-level
alleged perpetrators; (c) impact on the Sierra Leone legal professional and (d) training
and redeployment of Sierra Leonean personnel that have worked for the Court.”104 By
empowering and involving Sierra Leoneans in the international and local justice systems,
the Court has brought real justice to the people the people of Sierra Leone. The legacy of
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bringing to justice those most responsible for atrocities, building up the nation’s justice
system, and empowering the local citizens will help to prevent future atrocities. At a
meeting of the UN Security Council in June 2007, the President of the Council (and
agreeing speakers) described the Special Court as contributing to “strengthening stability
in Sierra Leone and the sub-region and [to] bringing an end to impunity.”105 Furthermore,
the indictments and arrest of Charles Taylor illustrated that even the most powerful
leaders can be subject to international law.106
On an international level, the Special Court has helped to create a “highly
developed and sophisticated body of law, in which the definitions and scope of war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide have been explored, along with the various
forms of participation and liability, the available excuses, justifications and defences,
procedural matters, issues concerning the rights of the accused and the relevant
considerations in determining appropriate penalties.”107 Notably, the Special Court was
the first to try cases about the war crime of forced marriage,108 conscription, enlistment
or use of child soldiers on an international level 109 with the AFRC and CDF trial
judgements. 110 The RUF sentencing judgement (in April 2009) was “the first ever
[conviction] within an international or internationalized criminal tribunal for the war
crime of attacking personnel involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping
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mission, and for the crimes against humanity of sexual slavery and forced marriage (as an
inhumane act).”111
Additionally, international criminal tribunals such as the Special Court provide a great
deal of guidance to the International Criminal Court.112
These significant additions to international criminal law are important not only on
an international level, but on the domestic as well; there is evidence that international
tribunal law is influencing national courts’ case law.113 By building on international law
and creating precedents in emerging areas of law, such as child soldiers, the Court
achieved significance not only for the people of Sierra Leone, whose worst criminals had
to be brought to justice in order for the society to be able to move on, but also for an
international community that requires guidance in trying future perpetrators of these
crimes. Most importantly, the Special Court of Sierra Leone provided a mechanism for
the carrying out of international legal obligations that were required by the “prosecution
and punishment of perpetrators of serious violations of human rights.”114 No one is above
the law, and the international community has contributed to the furthering of this
principle by creating the Court. This illustrated to Sierra Leoneans and the world that
what happened in Sierra Leone was recognized as unacceptable and that assistance is
always available to help rid the world of impunity.
Conclusion
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It is undeniable that, in a perfect world, the Court would cost less and every person
possible would be held accountable for their actions. Indeed, it is easy to criticize and
find flaws, especially when there are such great expectations. However, the case of the
Special Court of Sierra Leone demonstrates that it is important to be realistic and
carefully weigh the positive and negative consequences. What is most important about
the Court is its overall positive legacy, not just for international law (although clearly it is
immense) but for the people themselves whom the Court was able to reach. It is because
the positives far outweigh the negatives that ad-hoc tribunals, international courts, and
truth and reconciliation commissions must continue to exist and be used as mechanisms
to engender justice in post-conflict societies.
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